Protecting the Livelihood of Physicians

Frances Cullen has defended the livelihood of professionals for more than 25 years, guiding them through the professional license application process and defending their license against potential disciplinary action or criminal charges. Here are just a few representative cases involving physician clients: 

• A physician who completed another state’s application for licensure in haste entered an erroneous response regarding the completion of her Continuing Medical Education (CME), prompting that state to impose a public non-disciplinary order. The physician held active licenses in several states. Although the physician corrected the unintentional error, with other states poised to take action, Frances Cullen contacted and negotiated with the Georgia Medical Board and several other State Medical Boards to prevent reciprocal licensing action based upon her erroneous application response.
   

• With a strong knowledge of crimes that could prompt exclusionary status by the Office of Inspector General (OIG Exclusion), Frances Cullen provided sound advice to numerous physicians and other healthcare providers, including physician assistants and nurses, who face criminal charges to thereby avoid the exclusion. In two cases, a letter from Frances Cullen to the Court explaining the potential impact of an OIG Exclusion helped the providers obtain a more favorable criminal plea.
   

• When a state university terminated our client, a resident physician, from its residency training program based upon an allegation that he failed a pre-employment drug screen, we appealed the termination and our client was reinstated. At a hearing, we successfully challenged the collection process of the drug screen specimen at issue and presented overwhelming evidence that our client was not impaired. In a related case, we successfully defended our client in an investigation launched by the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP). Likewise, we represented the client before the medical board, which closed its investigation.
   

• In a case filed by the Georgia Composite Medical Board against a psychiatrist for improper prescribing practices, Frances Cullen prevailed at the initial hearing, with the administrative law judge finding no fault with the physician’s practice. The Board, on its own motion, reviewed the case and entered a contrary order seeking to discipline the doctor. Frances Cullen appealed to the Superior Court of Fulton County and prevailed, thereby preventing the imposition of any sanctions.

DOT Not at Fault for Fatal Collision

Marcus, et al. v. DOT; Superior Court of Fulton County
Civil Action File No. E16315
Affirmed Smith v. Commercial Transp.,et al., 220 GA. App. 866 (1996)

A 16-year-old Plaintiff sued for his own personal injuries and for the wrongful death of his father and sister, after their vehicle rear-ended a tractor-trailer on I-75 north. Plaintiff argued that the DOT’s failure to install a sign warning of a prior serious crash, which caused a long unexpected queue of traffic, constituted the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s crash.

We moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the negligent actions of the young driver were the proximate cause of the accident and that the only plausible explanation for the collision was that he fell asleep at the wheel. The trial court agreed and the decision was upheld by the Georgia Court of Appeals.

Verdict for the Defendant in Auto Collision

Ekeke v. Thompkins
Fulton County State Court
Civil Action No. 96VS0118029

Plaintiff alleged he was driving straight through an intersection and had a green light when the Defendant, driving in the opposite direction, failed to yield while turning left and caused a collision, which resulted in injuries to the Plaintiff. Defendant Thompkins, represented by Lee Pruett, argued she waited to turn left under a green light in the intersection, that the light turned yellow, then red, and she proceeded to clear the intersection and complete her left turn when Plaintiff came into the intersection under a red light and caused the collision. The jury agreed and rendered a verdict for Defendant. Defense verdict, 2002.

Jury Awards Less Than Amount Offered at Mediation in Tractor Rollover Case

Shannon Harris, et al. v. Adam Harris, et al., Superior Court of Barrow County, Civil Action No. 15-CV-001163

In September, 2017, Lee Pruett tried a case before a Barrow County jury and, along with Co-Counsel Bill Cowsert of Cowsert Heath in Athens, obtained a verdict in an amount which was more than $10,000 less than their client’s last offer at mediation one month prior.  The case, Harris v. Harris, involved a tractor rollover in which the Plaintiffs’ nine-year-old son sustained lacerations and multiple facial fractures. Defendant Adam Harris, the boy’s uncle, allowed the boy to drive the tractor as they tried to remove a dead tree stump, and he admitted liability for the accident. Thus, the case went to the jury solely on the issue of damages. The Defendant conceded all of the incurred medical expenses but disputed future medicals and the Plaintiffs’ contention that the injuries had caused a change in their son’s personality. In closing, the Plaintiffs’ attorney asked for $1.5 million. The jury returned a verdict for $170,614.

Defense Verdict for GDOT in South Georgia Smoke and Fog Case

Salem v. The Georgia Department of Transportation; Superior Court of Wayne County
Civil Action File No. 06CV0271
Defense Verdict:  June, 2016

In Salem v. The Georgia Department of Transportation, the Plaintiff sued for a catastrophic brain injury he sustained in an automobile collision that occurred just outside of Jesup, Georgia. Specifically, Plaintiff contended that the DOT and its employees breached their duty of care by failing to follow the DOT’s own policies and procedures detailing the specific protocol to follow when a smoke and/or fog hazard existed on a state highway.  In response, Levy Pruett Cullen successfully argued that DOT properly responded to the smoke/fog on the roadway and that the crash was caused by the negligence of the drivers.

On June 24, 2016, after a five-day trial, the jury returned a defense verdict. The Plaintiff appealed the issue of whether summary judgment was properly granted to one of the GDOT individual Defendants.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision on April 17, 2018, and the defense verdict stands.

Court of Appeals Reversal Leads to Big Win for DeKalb County

Brown v. DeKalb County et al., A15A0265 and Little et al. v. DeKalb County et al., A15A0267, 1-7, 5 (Ga. App. July 28, 2015)

In a big win for DeKalb County, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed itself on the issue of whether lay testimony as to speed, based only on the experience of impact, constituted admissible evidence to defeat summary judgment.

On May 3, 2011, Plaintiffs were driving on Custer Ave, attempting to cross Moreland Ave, when they crashed into the front of a DeKalb County fire truck entering the intersection on Moreland Ave, in route to an emergency call, with lights and sirens activated, and the air horn sounding. DeKalb County, represented by Levy & Pruett, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that there was no evidence that the firefighters breached any duty or that any alleged breach constituted the proximate cause of this collision. The trial court agreed and entered summary judgment for DeKalb County on April 1, 2014. Plaintiffs then appealed the trial court’s Order. Surprisingly, on June 17, 2015, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment because “a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the fire truck proceeded past the red signal ‘only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation’ OCGA § 40-6-6 (2), and ‘with due regard for the safety of all persons.’” Brown v. DeKalb County et al., A15A0265 and Little et al. v. DeKalb County et al., A15A0267, 1-7, 5 (Ga. App. June 17, 2015). Specifically, the Court relied on the Plaintiff passenger’s “guestimate” that the fire truck was traveling 60-70 mph at the time of impact, based only on how the impact felt, and reasoned that there was a question of fact as to whether the fire truck slowed down before entering the intersection.

On June 25, 2015, we filed a Motion for Reconsideration on behalf of the County, arguing that the Court of Appeals’ opinion that an individual can testify to the speed of a vehicle based only her subjective experience of the collision was without precedent. Moreover, we argued that the Court failed to address the case of Boatner v. Sims, 115 Ga. App. 284 (1967), which specifically found that evidence of speed with nothing more than the witness’s selfserving testimony based on experiencing the impact, was inadmissible. A month later, on July 28, 2015, the Court of Appeals issued a second opinion granting in full DeKalb County’s Motion for Reconsideration, a rarity in appellate procedure. In a complete reversal, the Court found that Plaintiff’s “testimony that the car was traveling 60 to 70 mph could not be rationally based [only] on her perception of how the impact felt” because she was not an accident reconstructionist and had never before been hit by a car traveling at that speed. Brown v. DeKalb County, et al., A15A0265 and Little et al. v. DeKalb County et al., A15A0267, 1-9, 7 (Ga. App. July 28, 2015). On reconsideration, the Court of Appeals relied on Boatner v. Sims, emphasizing the lack of a rational link between Plaintiff’s opinion based only on experiencing the impact and the speed of a vehicle she never saw.

Summary Judgment Granted in Food-Borne Illness Case

Charles Craft v. MEEK MD5, LLC
Chatham County Superior Court
Civil Action File No. CV11-0752-BA
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment granted January, 2013
Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed December 27, 2013

Plaintiff alleged that on October 1, 2010, he ate chicken nuggets purchased at Defendant’s franchise restaurant and, approximately three-and-a-half hours later, began to experience nausea and diarrhea.  Three days later he was diagnosed with Salmonella.  Plaintiff claimed medical bills of $21,777.05 and over $135,000 in lost income and loss of earning capacity.  He alleged the chicken nuggets were undercooked and were the proximate cause of his injuries.

Levy Pruett Cullen represented the Defendant restaurant. The parties conducted discovery, including the depositions of Plaintiff and employees of Defendant, and Defendant retained Dr. Allen Sklaver as its expert in food-borne illness. By affidavit, Dr. Sklaver testified that Department of Health records showed no other cases of salmonella traceable to Defendant’s restaurant, that the restaurant’s cooking temperatures insured that no pathogens could survive, that in most cases of Salmonella it takes at least six hours for the symptoms to begin, and that Plaintiff could have gotten the pathogen in the fruit and cheese he ate in the preceding days or from contaminated water he got in his mouth at work. Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that under Georgia law, when a plaintiff has no direct evidence that the defendant’s food was unwholesome, only circumstantial evidence that he became sick after eating it, the plaintiff must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis for the cause of the illness. The trial court agreed that Plaintiff had failed to meet this burden, and the trial court granted summary judgment to Defendant. In an unpublished opinion, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant.

Independent Contractor Not Liable for Plaintiff's Injuries

Darlene B. Leaks v. Jan Co. Central, Inc., Diversified Commercial Builders, Inc., and David Kelly Contracting, Inc.,
Civil Action File No. 2008EV004450E, Fulton State Court
Ruling: Court granted Defendant David Kelly Contracting’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Date:  May 16, 2011

Summary:  On March 27, 2007, the Plaintiff allegedly injured herself when she fell while trying to get out of a defective chair at a Burger King restaurant located in downtown Atlanta. The Plaintiff sued three separate defendants: (1) Jan Co. Central, Inc., the owner and operator of the Broad Street Burger King; (2) Diversified Commercial Builders, Inc., the contractor hired by Jan Co. to renovate the Burger King and (3) David Kelly Contracting, the subcontractor hired by Diversified to perform the carpentry portions of the renovations of the Burger King, including the removal and replacement of tabletops and seating.

Defendant David Kelly Contracting, represented by Levy Pruett Cullen, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that its work on the chair where the Plaintiff allegedly fell was performed without negligence, pursuant to specific instructions by its employer, Diversified, and paid for and accepted by Diversified over seven months prior to Plaintiff’s alleged fall.

Georgia’s “Acceptance Doctrine” generally provides that where a contractor who does not hold itself out as an expert in the design work, performs its work without negligence, and the work is approved and accepted by the owner or the one who contracted for the work on the owner’s behalf, the contractor is not liable for injuries resulting from the defective design of the work. Hollis & Spann, Inc. V. Hopkins, 301 Ga. App. 29, 31 (2009). The exceptions for inherently or intrinsically dangerous work, for nuisances per se, and for work so negligently defective as to be imminently dangerous to third persons, only apply in cases where the contractor is guilty of negligence in the performance of its work. [David Allen Co. v. Benton, 260 GA. 557, 558 (1990).]

The Court found that the evidence was undisputed that the work performed by Defendant David Kelly Contracting on the chair where Plaintiff allegedly fell was performed without negligence, was performed pursuant to specific instructions by its employer, Diversified, and was paid for and accepted by Diversified over seven months prior to Plaintiff’s alleged fall.  Consequently, the Court found that any recovery from the Defendant David Kelly Contracting was barred by the Acceptance Doctrine.

Defense Verdict for DeKalb County Police Department

Taylor v. DeKalb County; State Court of DeKalb County
Civil Action File No. 06A50694-7
Defense Verdict:  December, 2009

The Plaintiff was a front-seat passenger in a vehicle driven by Robert Lamar, traveling north on Clairmont Road. A DeKalb County police officer was driving southbound in a DeKalb County police unit on his way to back-up a fellow officer. At approximately 2:30 a.m., Mr. Lamar attempted to make a left turn into an apartment complex across the southbound lanes of Clairmont and was struck by the police officer. The Plaintiff, who sustained a Traumatic Brain Injury and multiple fractures requiring surgery, sued DeKalb County alleging that the officer was speeding without his blue lights and sirens activated.  The jury returned a defense verdict on December 17, 2009.

Though the police officer testified that he was traveling "around the speed limit," there was expert testimony from both the Plaintiff and defense experts that the police officer may have been traveling three to five miles above the speed limit. This evidence authorized the judge to charge the jury that the police officer was guilty of negligence per se.

Nevertheless, DeKalb County argued successfully that the sole proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of Robert Lamar. Specifically, we argued that Mr. Lamar was impaired from drinking all night, that he failed field sobriety testing, and that he recklessly turned in front of the police officer who had the right of way. The jury found in favor of DeKalb County.

Court of Appeals Affirms Summary Judgment for Newnan Hospital

Houston v. Newnan Hospital, Georgia Court of Appeals
Civil Action File No. A09A0688
Newnan Hospital Motion for Summary Judgment Affirmed May 5, 2009

The Plaintiff was a patient at Newnan Hospital where he was treated and discharged the same day. He had been given narcotic medication and was told not to drive for a certain number of hours. Plaintiff denied anyone gave him such an instruction. Soon after being discharged, Plaintiff drove from the hospital. A nurse called the Newnan police department to inform them that Plaintiff was driving under the influence of prescription drugs. The City of Newnan police arrested Plaintiff for DUI. In the subsequent criminal trial, Plaintiff was found not guilty. He then brought suit against the hospital and the nurse for a number of claims, including malicious prosecution.

Levy Pruett Cullen filed the Answer on behalf of the hospital and the nurse and proceeded to defend the case.  We had all of the Plaintiff’s claims except malicious prosecution dismissed based on the applicable statutes of limitations. We then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the remaining claim of malicious prosecution. In the motion, we argued that the Plaintiff had failed to prove the essential elements of the cause of action: he failed to show an absence of probable cause for his criminal prosecution for DUI, he failed to show malice on the part of Defendants, and he failed to show that Defendants instigated his arrest or prosecution.    

We pointed out that at the Plaintiff’s criminal trial, his motion for directed verdict was denied. Under Georgia law, that ruling constitutes a binding determination that probable cause exists. Thus, we argued that it was impossible for Plaintiff to prove an absence of probable cause. We argued that the Plaintiff had failed to prove malice because there was no evidence that the nurse’s actions were motivated by personal spite against Plaintiff or a general disregard directed by chance against Plaintiff.  Finally, we argued that Plaintiff had failed to show the Defendants had instigated his arrest for DUI.  We pointed out that the nurse did nothing more than inform the police that the Plaintiff was driving a vehicle under the influence of narcotics, and that the police officer made his own investigation and independent decision to arrest Plaintiff.  

The Coweta County State Court granted our Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial court found that Plaintiff had failed to prove two essential elements of his claim for malicious prosecution: Plaintiff had failed to show an absence of probable cause for his DUI criminal prosecution, and he had failed to show malice on the part of Defendants. Plaintiff appealed to the Georgia Court of Appeals. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of our motion. The Court held that the evidence supported the trial court’s judgment and that there was no reversible error of law.  

Verdict for Georgia DOT: Plaintiff's Injuries Caused by Drivers' Negligence

Fraker v. DOT, Superior Court of Fulton County
Civil Action File No. 2003CV71188
Defense Verdict: October, 2006.

Two were injured and one killed after a series of collisions in a Georgia DOT work zone on the ramp from Georgia 400 southbound to I-285 eastbound. The Plaintiff, a 56-year-old man at the time, had medical expenses in excess of $1,000,000. He sued the DOT alleging negligent design and maintenance of the work zone, specifically, that the collisions were caused by confusing striping, lack of lighting in the construction zone, and the lack of warning signs. Plaintiff’s best evidence were photographs taken by the Fulton County Police Department, which showed striping that had been ground out by the contractors, and approved by DOT, but were clearly visible in the photographs.

DOT argued that the signing complied with the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices. Additionally, our employees and an expert we hired from Pennsylvania were able to educate the jury on grinding procedures and the reality of “shadow” lines or “ghost” lines in a construction zone. Finally, we argued that the crash was caused by the negligence of the drivers involved. The jury found in favor of DOT.

Defense Verdict for Georgia DOT in GA 400 Crossover Accident

Hawa v. DOT, State Court of Fulton County
Civil Action File No. 04VS064364C
Defense Verdict

The Plaintiff suffered serious leg and pelvic injuries when a vehicle left the northbound lanes of Georgia 400, crossed the grassed median and collided with the Plaintiff and several other southbound vehicles. Plaintiff sued the Georgia Department of Transportation alleging the negligent design of Georgia 400. Specifically, the Plaintiff alleged the DOT should have installed guardrail or concrete barriers to prevent vehicles from crossing over the grass median which separated northbound traffic or Georgia 400 from southbound traffic. In support of this argument, the Plaintiff argued that most of the length of Georgia 400 between 85 and 285 had some type of barrier protection in the median. The last pretrial demand to DOT was $950,000.

We argued that the 44-foot wide median satisfied all engineering standards and guidelines in place at the time SR 400 was designed and constructed. Moreover, the DOT contended that a wide median gave drivers who left the paved surface of the roadway an opportunity to regain control and re-enter the travel way. By contrast, adding a guardrail or concrete barrier would be placing an additional hazard closer to the road so that drivers who left the roadway would be more likely to strike the barrier and could be deflected back into traffic. DOT further asserted that the sole proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the other driver who left the northbound lanes of Georgia 400 and crossed the grass median without ever touching his brakes. The jury returned a defense verdict in favor of DOT, but against the Estate of Moses King, the errant driver, for $2,700,000.

DOT Entitled to Sovereign Immunity

Ogles v. DOT, 277 Ga. App. 22 (2005)
DOT’s Motion for Summary Judgment upheld by Georgia Supreme Court.

The Plaintiff was rendered a quadriplegic in a single car accident on a county road in Jones County. the Plaintiff sued several Defendants, including DOT and Jones County, which before the crash, had entered into a series of contracts concerning the improvements of Griswoldville Road. The shoulders of the road were badly rutted and undoubtedly contributed to the accident.

Susan Levy was retained to assist the Attorney General’s office at the summary judgment stage of the litigation and on Appeal. We filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff was not a third party beneficiary to the contract between DOT and Jones County and that DOT was entitled to sovereign immunity. The Trial Court agreed. The Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Trial Court’s opinion. The Plaintiff then filed a petition to the Georgia Supreme Court. Susan filed a Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Petition and the Supreme Court found in DOT’s favor. Consequently, DOT was able to get out of the case on legal grounds.

Bathroom Injuries Not the Fault of Boston Market

Wilder v. Platinum Rotisserie, LLC, d/b/a Boston Market
Georgia Court of Appeals
Case No. A04A2035

Plaintiff alleged the Defendant's bathroom partition door broke and fell, striking Plaintiff's leg and resulting in permanent injuries. Defendant Boston Market, represented by Lee Pruett, argued the Plaintiff had failed to show that the Defendant had superior knowledge of a dangerous condition and that inconsistent testimony given by the Defendant's manager did not create any issues of material fact. The State Court of Dekalb County granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed in a 2004 unpublished opinion.

DOT Dismissed from Wrongful Death Case

Greer v. DOT, et al.; Superior Court of Hall County
Civil Action File No. 01-CV-77-B
June 20, 2003

Plaintiff sued for the wrongful death of her son who was struck by a vehicle as he crossed the state route in front of his home. Plaintiff alleged that DOT was responsible because construction caused the traffic to back-up, and that the traffic cue impeded the visibility of the driver who struck her son.

We filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on behalf of DOT on the grounds that nothing DOT did or did not do was the proximate cause of the child’s death. The Court agreed and dismissed DOT from the case.

Jury Agrees That Injuries Not Proximately Caused by Accident

Couch v. Swift
Dekalb County State Court
Civil Action No. 02A87427-1

The Plaintiff alleged the Defendant failed to secure the trailer door on an 18-wheeler, and the door swung open and struck the Plaintiff's vehicle, causing permanent back injuries to Plaintiff. Defendant Swift, represented by Lee Pruett, argued he breached no duty by failing to secure the trailer door because he had no prior knowledge of problems with the door or latch, and it was not physically possible to check the door before the accident occurred because the two trucks were parked close together and backed into the loading dock. Lee also argued that Plaintiff's injuries were not proximately caused by the accident. The jury agreed. Defense verdict.

Summary Judgment Affirmed in Trip and Fall Case

Hindmon v. Virgil's Food Mart, Inc.
252 Ga. App. 732, 556 S.E.2d 135

The Plaintiff alleged Defendant restaurant owner was negligent in putting down a worn rug at the restaurant entranceway. Plaintiff tripped on the rug and allegedly sustained injuries as a result. Defendant Virgil's Food Mart, represented by Lee Pruett, argued Plaintiff had actual knowledge of the alleged hazardous condition and that any inconsistent statements made by her regarding her knowledge of the condition had to be construed against her. The Superior Court of Polk County granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed.

Property Owner Not at Fault in Auto Accident

Howard v. Gourmet Concepts International, Inc.
242 Ga. App. 521, 529 S.E.2d 406

The Plaintiff alleged she was severely injured when she turned left from a stop sign on a side street and was struck by another vehicle on the main road. The Plaintiff sued the driver of the other vehicle, his employer, the county, and Gourmet Concepts, owner of the property adjacent to the intersection. Plaintiff alleged Gourmet Concepts negligently maintained trees and shrubs on the property, causing a hazardous condition that obstructed her view of the oncoming traffic. Defendant Gourmet Concepts, represented by Lee Pruett, argued Plaintiff failed to prove that Gourmet Concepts had knowledge of prior accidents, and that the trees and shrubs were not the proximate cause of the accident. The State Court of Dekalb County granted Gourmet Concepts' Motion for Summary Judgment. The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed.

Directed Verdict for Georgia DOT in Flooding Case

Reidling v. DOT, State Court of Hall County
Civil Action File No. 03CV2359C
Directed Verdict: December, 2007

The Plaintiffs alleged their property was damaged due to flooding of a nearby creek after The Georgia DOT negligently designed the Pearl Nix Parkway Extension in Gainesville, Georgia. Specifically, the Plaintiffs argued that (1) the DOT failed to provide for the disposal of the excess fill dirt in the original design plans; (2) the DOT negligently approved the contractor’s placing the waste pit adjacent to the Project in an alleged flood plain; and (3) that the construction of the Pearl Nix Parkway Extension and the creation of the waste pit resulted in an increase in storm water run-off during moderate and heavy rains, thereby forcing Flat Creek to swell beyond its banks and flood the Plaintiffs’ property.

Prior to trial, on motions for summary judgment, we were able to narrow the issue to just the question of negligent design. At trial, after Plaintiffs presented 3 ½ days of testimony and rested their case, we moved for a directed verdict and won. The Judge found that Plaintiffs had been given the opportunity and still failed to produce enough evidence of negligent design to go to the jury. The Judge directed that a verdict be entered in favor of DOT.

Defending Nurses Accused of Drug Diversion

Drug diversion is defined as the misappropriation of prescription medication without legal authorization, such as when a nurse diverts medication from a pyxis machine. Drug diversion allegations are very serious in nature and could lead to criminal charges if state or federal authorities are contacted.

In numerous cases when employers have fired nurses and reported them to the Georgia Board of Nursing for drug diversion, Frances Cullen of Levy Pruett Cullen has helped guide nurses to the appropriate drug treatment program, assisted them with the Georgia Board of Nursing’s investigation process, helped them locate an appropriate nurse advocate to advocate on their behalf before the Georgia Board of Nursing, and negotiated a more favorable outcome to monitor aftercare following completion of treatment. She has worked with many nurses to help them return to work as a Registered Nurse.

• For a nurse applicant who had been under a Consent Order in another state, Frances Cullen advised her on closing out the other state’s Consent Order, and obtained the paperwork necessary for her to obtain her license from the Georgia Board of Nursing.
• In a case where a nurse was criminally charged with Violation of the Controlled Substances Act (VGCSA) for writing fraudulent prescriptions, Frances Cullen represented the nurse in entering the most favorable plea for the crime charged, subsequently advising her about entering into a Consent Order with the Georgia Board of Nursing to enable her to return to the practice of nursing.
• For a nurse arrested and criminally charged with diverting controlled substances from her employer, Frances Cullen negotiated pre-trial drug court diversion of the case, which resulted in a disposition without court adjudication of guilt or a record of conviction.